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dc.contributor.authorHughes, David Alan
dc.date.accessioned2016-10-13T04:30:21Z
dc.date.available2016-10-13T04:30:21Z
dc.date.issued2016-05
dc.identifier.otherhughes_david_a_201605_phd
dc.identifier.urihttp://purl.galileo.usg.edu/uga_etd/hughes_david_a_201605_phd
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10724/36180
dc.description.abstractWhile public law considers the utility of judicial elections, theoretical scholarship has lacked a rigorous positive theoretical assessment of judicial elections on voter welfare. I specify a game-theoretic model of social welfare amidst judicial review and assess voters’ well-being with and without judicial elections. I propose that reduced transparency in the political environment might alleviate many problems associated with judicial elections, particularly pandering behavior, while affording citizens the opportunity of civic engagement. The theoretical results suggest voters can be made best off under non-transparent elected institutions for large classes of political environments. Analyzing voters and judges’ decision-making in all 50 states from 2001–2010, I find that the “real world” players in my game behave as anticipated in response to a fluid environment of information
dc.languageeng
dc.publisheruga
dc.rightspublic
dc.subjectLaw and Courts
dc.subjectJudicial Elections
dc.subjectRepresentation
dc.subjectAccountability
dc.subjectSocial Welfare
dc.titleAn information-based theory of judicial accountability and social welfare
dc.typeDissertation
dc.description.degreePhD
dc.description.departmentPolitical Science
dc.description.majorPolitical Science
dc.description.advisorRichard L. Vining
dc.description.committeeRichard L. Vining
dc.description.committeeTeena Wilhelm
dc.description.committeeKeith Dougherty
dc.description.committeeScott Ainsworth


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