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dc.contributor.authorAhumada, Peter
dc.date.accessioned2015-08-13T04:30:22Z
dc.date.available2015-08-13T04:30:22Z
dc.date.issued2015-05
dc.identifier.otherahumada_peter_201505_phd
dc.identifier.urihttp://purl.galileo.usg.edu/uga_etd/ahumada_peter_201505_phd
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10724/31550
dc.description.abstractThe discovery of rigidification by Kripke and its formalization by Kaplan in the case of a definite description was misinterpreted as providing a pretext for the theory of austere direct reference for names, according to which the meaning of a name is nothing more than the bearer of the name and its mode of presentation to the speaker is presumed irrelevant to effecting successful reference or to the thoughts the speaker is actually thinking about the object. Indeed, descriptions are dispensed with entirely in the approach which came to dominate linguistic philosophy. The austere approach, however, completely ignores the role parasitic reference plays in securing reference. The causal theory, meanwhile, has a number of flaws, including epistemic opacity and complete degeneracy with descriptivism once the links in its chains are articulated. To understand the theoretical implications of rigidification, a possible worlds semantics is created with the power set of possible worlds on both the domain and range sides of a language function. It allows Kripke’s examples where he uses a description to fix a reference, the contingent a priori and the necessary a posteriori, to be understood. The application of Dthat to a definite description creates a situation where the essential set of the object selected is present on the domain side of the function as well as on the range side. Since the set is on the domain side and since it is generally hidden, the result is a hidden word in your sentence. Since the set is on the range side, the result is that you do not know what you mean. You can know something about what you mean, however, and, as Kripke says, you might know your sentence is true automatically. Throughout the work, the hidden nature of these sentences is explored, and the so-called naïve view of names is rejected.
dc.languageeng
dc.publisheruga
dc.rightspublic
dc.subjectPhilosophy of language
dc.subjectnames
dc.subjectKripke
dc.subjectKaplan
dc.subjectDthat
dc.subjectrigidified descriptivism
dc.subjectaustere direct reference
dc.subjectparasitic reference
dc.subjectcausal theory
dc.subjectcontingent a priori
dc.subjectnecessary a posteriori
dc.subjectDonnellan
dc.subjectempty names
dc.subjectFrege’s puzzle
dc.titleLanguage
dc.title.alternativean overhaul of linguistic philosophy
dc.typeDissertation
dc.description.degreePhD
dc.description.departmentPhilosophy
dc.description.majorPhilosophy
dc.description.advisorRichard Winfield
dc.description.committeeRichard Winfield
dc.description.committeeSarah Wright
dc.description.committeeYuri Balashov


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