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dc.contributor.authorMoss, Gregory Scott
dc.date.accessioned2015-04-10T04:30:15Z
dc.date.available2015-04-10T04:30:15Z
dc.date.issued2014-08
dc.identifier.othermoss_gregory_s_201408_phd
dc.identifier.urihttp://purl.galileo.usg.edu/uga_etd/moss_gregory_s_201408_phd
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10724/31248
dc.description.abstractTraditionally, the concept of universality has been governed by four dogmas: the principle of non-contradiction, the finitude of the concept, the separation of the principles of universality and particularity, and the appeal to the given. From these dogmas four paradoxes of self-reference follow: the problem of the missing differentia, the problem of participation, the problem of psychologism, and the problem of onto-theology. In this dissertation I show how these dogmas, as well as the paradoxes that follow from them, first arise in Ancient Greek philosophy, and how they continually re-appear throughout the history of Western philosophy. Hegel, in his Science of Logic, develops a novel concept of universality in which he defines universality as self-differentiation. Following the general historical exposition, I systematically reconstruct Hegel’s Logic of the Concept where he defines the concept as self-differentiation. In argue that self-differentiation undermines the classical dogmas of universality, and thereby solves the four paradoxes of self-differentiation.
dc.languageeng
dc.publisheruga
dc.rightspublic
dc.subjectUniversality, Particularity, Individuality, Self-determination, Concepts, Hegel, Metaphysics, Epistemology, Science of Logic, Self-reference
dc.titleThe being of the concept
dc.title.alternativea hHistorical and systematic inquiry
dc.typeDissertation
dc.description.degreePhD
dc.description.departmentPhilosophy
dc.description.majorPhilosophy
dc.description.advisorRichard Dien Winfield
dc.description.committeeRichard Dien Winfield
dc.description.committeeRichard Winfield
dc.description.committeeEdward Halper
dc.description.committeeElizabeth Brient


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