Phenomenology without clear target implications : the role of uncertainty in judgment

Abstract

The influence of phenomenology, without clear implications for the target of judgment, on use or disuse of available information was examined by providing informational input via behavioral priming and experiential input via induced feelings of uncertainty. Participants were primed with either traits or exemplars, which were either negatively or positively valenced. Afterwards half of the participants were made to feel either uncertain, by reading a confusing story, or certain, by reading a very clear and simple story. Finally participants judged an ambiguously described person named Donald on several dimensions. Although no results were found for the exemplar priming condition, results for the trait priming condition provided tentative support for predictions. Participants primed with traits and made to feel certain produced assimilated judgments of Donald, whereas participants made to feel uncertain produced contrasted judgments. Curiously, however, this pattern of results reversed towards the end of the semester.