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dc.contributor.authorCliett, Ryan Jackson
dc.description.abstractThe goals of this paper are three fold. First, we present a simple analyst recommendation theory and point out the comparative advantages analysts have over the investing public. Next, we evaluate the information content of analyst recommendations following Wommack (1996) by examining the announcement day effects associated with analyst recommendations. Lastly, we test the impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure on the announcement day effects of analyst recommendations by running a difference in means test on the cumulative abnormal returns generated before the law was implemented vs. after the law was implemented. We find positive announcement effects associated with analyst upgrades and negative effects associated with downgrades - consistent with previous results. We find no evidence consistent with the hypothesis that Regulation Fair Disclosure has decreased the amount of information contained in analyst recommendations.
dc.languageAnalyst recommendations and Regulation Fair Disclosure : the impact on announcement day effects
dc.subjectAnalyst Recommendation
dc.subjectRegulation Fair Disclosure
dc.titleAnalyst recommendations and Regulation Fair Disclosure : the impact on announcement day effects
dc.description.departmentBanking and Finance
dc.description.majorBanking and Finance
dc.description.advisorMarc Lipson
dc.description.committeeMarc Lipson
dc.description.committeeJim Linck
dc.description.committeeKathleen Fuller

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