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dc.contributor.authorYeary, Mark Aaron
dc.date.accessioned2014-03-04T22:00:37Z
dc.date.available2014-03-04T22:00:37Z
dc.date.issued2002-08
dc.identifier.otheryeary_mark_a_200208_ma
dc.identifier.urihttp://purl.galileo.usg.edu/uga_etd/yeary_mark_a_200208_ma
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10724/29357
dc.description.abstractThis thesis exams the actions of Supreme Court Justices on three natural Court terms (1958 - 1961, 1976 - 1980, and 1994 - 2000), to show that justices do behave in a strategic fashion. In particular, the belief a justice has as to the likelihood of the direction of the vote of the moderate justice determines whether or not a justice will vote in a strategic manner. For this examination, a formal game-theoretic model is developed, with hypotheses derived from the model being tested utilizing variables to measure the likelihood of the moderates vote, as well as others, and logit.
dc.languageA game theoretic examination of strategic action on the United States Supreme Court
dc.publisheruga
dc.rightspublic
dc.subjectSupreme Court
dc.subjectstrategic action
dc.subjectformal theory
dc.subjectgame theory
dc.subjectjustice
dc.subjectthesis
dc.titleA game theoretic examination of strategic action on the United States Supreme Court
dc.typeThesis
dc.description.degreeMA
dc.description.departmentPolitical Science
dc.description.majorPolitical Science
dc.description.advisorRobert Grafstein
dc.description.committeeRobert Grafstein
dc.description.committeeStefanie A. Lindquist
dc.description.committeeJeffrey L. Yates


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