Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorKallerman, James Arthur
dc.date.accessioned2014-03-04T21:02:13Z
dc.date.available2014-03-04T21:02:13Z
dc.date.issued2013-05
dc.identifier.otherkallerman_james_a_201305_phd
dc.identifier.urihttp://purl.galileo.usg.edu/uga_etd/kallerman_james_a_201305_phd
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10724/28777
dc.description.abstractThis study demonstrates how politics affect the racial composition of the United States district courts. I theorize that presidents and senators nominate minority judges to reduce electoral uncertainty. My analytical framework hinges on one idea: minority nominations are more politically useful in some situations than they are in others. State-level demographics, minority underrepresentation on district benches, and presidential election cycles are among the factors employed to capture the political utility of a minority nomination to a given district court vacancy. Results indicate that when conditions suggest minority votes are highly valued, minorities are appointed. When the payoff of a minority nomination is negligible, the probability that a given seat will be filled with a minority is negligible.
dc.languageeng
dc.publisheruga
dc.rightspublic
dc.subjectNominations
dc.subjectfederal
dc.subjectdistrict
dc.subjectcourt
dc.subjectminority judges
dc.titlePolitics and nominations of minorities to the United States district courts
dc.typeDissertation
dc.description.degreePhD
dc.description.departmentPolitical Science
dc.description.majorPolitical Science
dc.description.advisorScott Ainsworth
dc.description.committeeScott Ainsworth
dc.description.committeeRichard Vining
dc.description.committeeSusan B. Haire
dc.description.committeeRyan Bakker


Files in this item

FilesSizeFormatView

There are no files associated with this item.

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record