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dc.contributor.authorEubanks, Peter Kyle
dc.date.accessioned2014-03-04T21:01:35Z
dc.date.available2014-03-04T21:01:35Z
dc.date.issued2013-05
dc.identifier.othereubanks_peter_k_201305_ma
dc.identifier.urihttp://purl.galileo.usg.edu/uga_etd/eubanks_peter_k_201305_ma
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10724/28725
dc.description.abstractThe aim of this paper is to explain the decision-making process that ultimately led the United States to invade Iraq in March of 2003. Emphasis is placed on the individual actors involved, and it is suggested that significant levels of uncertainty and incomplete or inaccurate information, on both sides, were the main causal mechanisms as to why the two sides were unable to resolve their disputes diplomatically. The model will show that leaders in both the United States and Iraq were acting rationally in the series of events leading to the invasion, and that it is because of the outcomes of these events, which created high levels of uncertainty about the others intentions, that ultimately left the United States with no other viable alternative aside from invading.
dc.languageeng
dc.publisheruga
dc.rightspublic
dc.subjectIraq Invasion, United States foreign policy, Game theory, Formal theory, Strategy, Decision tree, Game tree, International affairs, International relations, Policy analysis
dc.titleThe path to war
dc.title.alternativewhy the United States invaded Iraq
dc.typeThesis
dc.description.degreeMA
dc.description.departmentInternational Affairs
dc.description.majorPolitical Science & International Affairs
dc.description.advisorChad Clay
dc.description.committeeChad Clay
dc.description.committeeRobert Grafstein
dc.description.committeeKeith Dougherty


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