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    The path to war

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    Date
    2013-05
    Author
    Eubanks, Peter Kyle
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    Abstract
    The aim of this paper is to explain the decision-making process that ultimately led the United States to invade Iraq in March of 2003. Emphasis is placed on the individual actors involved, and it is suggested that significant levels of uncertainty and incomplete or inaccurate information, on both sides, were the main causal mechanisms as to why the two sides were unable to resolve their disputes diplomatically. The model will show that leaders in both the United States and Iraq were acting rationally in the series of events leading to the invasion, and that it is because of the outcomes of these events, which created high levels of uncertainty about the others intentions, that ultimately left the United States with no other viable alternative aside from invading.
    URI
    http://purl.galileo.usg.edu/uga_etd/eubanks_peter_k_201305_ma
    http://hdl.handle.net/10724/28725
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