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dc.contributor.authorHill, Michael William
dc.date.accessioned2014-03-04T20:38:51Z
dc.date.available2014-03-04T20:38:51Z
dc.date.issued2012-12
dc.identifier.otherhill_michael_w_201212_ma
dc.identifier.urihttp://purl.galileo.usg.edu/uga_etd/hill_michael_w_201212_ma
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10724/28532
dc.description.abstractThe reputational perspective on boards of directors lends a number of insights to the corporate governance literature which clarifies and explains outcomes which are counter to those using an agency based perspective. The theoretical perspective developed in this work suggests that recent heightened scrutiny on boards has increased the likelihood that outside directors will act to in ways to protect their reputations. Reputation management actions by outside directors reveal that they may not be risk neutral but, in actuality, risk-averse executives seeking to protect their own reputations from potential damage arising as a result of their directorship duties. As a means of protecting their reputation, outside directors may therefore have a vested interest in creating celebrity CEOs.
dc.languageeng
dc.publisheruga
dc.rightspublic
dc.subjectreputation
dc.subjectcorporate governance
dc.subjectcelebrity CEOs
dc.subjectoutside directors
dc.subjectagency theory
dc.subjectexecutive reputation
dc.titleManaging reputation in the boardroom
dc.typeThesis
dc.description.degreeMA
dc.description.departmentManagement
dc.description.majorBusiness Administration
dc.description.advisorAllen Amason
dc.description.committeeAllen Amason
dc.description.committeeChristine Shropshire
dc.description.committeeMichael Pfarrer
dc.description.committeeScott Graffin


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