A theory of responsible procreation
Weeks, Rory Allen
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Procreation is a moral activity. And we have moral intuitions concerning when procreative choices are wrong. Yet given traditional ethical principles based on the standard account of harm, it is impossible to find any procreative choice—no matter how reckless or uninformed—is wrong. This is intolerable. But by focusing on the preconception and prenatal procreative choices of potential and prospective parents rather than the interests of possible or potential children, this thesis avoids the pitfalls into which traditional ethical theories fall. To account for our moral intuitions about procreation, this thesis therefore proposes two sufficient conditions for when the procreative choices of potential and prospective parents are morally indefensible. And in so doing, this thesis defends an ethics of procreation—Responsible Procreation.