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dc.contributor.authorChapman, Stephanie
dc.date.accessioned2014-03-04T20:02:05Z
dc.date.available2014-03-04T20:02:05Z
dc.date.issued2011-08
dc.identifier.otherchapman_stephanie_201108_ma
dc.identifier.urihttp://purl.galileo.usg.edu/uga_etd/chapman_stephanie_201108_ma
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10724/27416
dc.description.abstractI examine a model of price discrimination with congestion and find that when service providers are allowed to sell priority access to networks, consumers are made better off in most cases. In particular, profit is greatest when priority access is sold to a low value consumer, though high value consumers have a higher willingness to pay for priority when both consumers are served. Selling a priority right makes it profitable to serve all consumers in all sections of the parameter space. This result is robust to both single price monopoly pricing and third degree price discrimination. When no priority is offered, greater flexibility in pricing leads to greater profit for the firm, with the highest profit being achieved under fully nonlinear pricing. This analysis has implications for the net neutrality debate, particularly that consumer welfare may be made improved if net neutrality is relaxed.
dc.languageeng
dc.publisheruga
dc.rightspublic
dc.subjectprice discrimination
dc.subjectnet neutrality
dc.subjectcongestion
dc.titlePrice discrimination with congestion effects
dc.typeThesis
dc.description.degreeMA
dc.description.departmentEconomics
dc.description.majorEconomics
dc.description.advisorJohn Turner
dc.description.committeeJohn Turner
dc.description.committeeJonathan Williams
dc.description.committeeChristopher Cornwell


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