Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorSchneider, Matthew Lee
dc.date.accessioned2014-03-04T18:29:36Z
dc.date.available2014-03-04T18:29:36Z
dc.date.issued2010-05
dc.identifier.otherschneider_matthew_l_201005_phd
dc.identifier.urihttp://purl.galileo.usg.edu/uga_etd/schneider_matthew_l_201005_phd
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10724/26477
dc.description.abstractThe self-ownership thesis claims that all persons own themselves and therefore have overriding control of their bodies and labor. Libertarians have argued that the self-ownership thesis also generates robust property rights to things produced with one’s labor, and prohibits redistributive taxation of any sort. Robert Nozick, in particular, argues for robust property rights not only to the products of one’s labor but to natural resources, which on his view can be acquired without the consent of others. I argue that the self-ownership thesis generates a host of desirable individual rights and freedoms, and conditions property and other normative rights to the products of our labor and resources in the world so as to protect and enhance individual freedom and autonomy to pursue a good life. However, I argue against the libertarian analysis of self-ownership, concluding that self-ownership does not justify full, liberal property rights to the products of one’s labor, nor does self-ownership generate unilateral rights to appropriate natural resources, or prohibit restrictions to the privatization of these resources, so long as these restrictions do not abrogate individual freedom and autonomy to pursue a good life.
dc.languageeng
dc.publisheruga
dc.rightspublic
dc.subjectSelf-ownership
dc.subjectProperty rights
dc.subjectMotherhood
dc.subjectParental rights
dc.subjectCapital resources
dc.subjectNatural resources
dc.subjectCohen
dc.subjectOkin
dc.subjectNozick
dc.subjectLibertarianism
dc.subjectLiberalism
dc.subjectRawls
dc.subjectFlourishing
dc.subjectWelfare
dc.subjectProduction
dc.titleSelf-ownership, property right and freedom
dc.title.alternativere-conceiving property in ourselves
dc.typeDissertation
dc.description.degreePhD
dc.description.departmentPhilosophy
dc.description.majorPhilosophy
dc.description.advisorVictoria Davio
dc.description.committeeVictoria Davio
dc.description.committeeRichard Winfield
dc.description.committeeMelissa Fahmy


Files in this item

FilesSizeFormatView

There are no files associated with this item.

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record