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dc.contributor.authorSnyder, Eric Paul
dc.date.accessioned2014-03-04T18:20:39Z
dc.date.available2014-03-04T18:20:39Z
dc.date.issued2009-08
dc.identifier.othersnyder_eric_p_200908_ma
dc.identifier.urihttp://purl.galileo.usg.edu/uga_etd/snyder_eric_p_200908_ma
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10724/25952
dc.description.abstractThe following concerns vagueness and the Sorites Paradox. It attempts to deflate the significance of the paradox via broadly ‘pragmatic’ considerations. First, I argue that vagueness is a necessary feature of natural languages, i.e. we could not do without vague expressions. Second, I give necessary conditions for Sorites construction and argue that its plausibility relies on our presupposing a certain metalinguistic imperative, itself deriving from the necessity of vagueness. Finally, I give the prevailing semantics for gradable predicates and show that, in general, if this semantics is correct, then the Sorites poses no threat to the semantics of prototypical vague predicates. If my arguments are on track, we have a nice explanation for why this paradox has remained obstinate for so long: We are searching for ‘hidden’ boundaries that do not and, in fact, could not exist. Rather, the problem is essentially with classical logic and set-theory.
dc.languageeng
dc.publisheruga
dc.rightspublic
dc.subjectVagueness
dc.subjectSorites Paradox
dc.subjectContextualism
dc.subjectPragmatic Presupposition
dc.subjectGradable Adjectives
dc.titleBoundaries and prudence
dc.title.alternativewhy you don't care about the Sorites Paradox
dc.typeThesis
dc.description.degreeMA
dc.description.departmentPhilosophy
dc.description.majorPhilosophy
dc.description.advisorYuri Balashov
dc.description.committeeYuri Balashov
dc.description.committeeRene Jagnow
dc.description.committeeCharles Cross


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