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dc.contributor.authorShrira, Ilan
dc.date.accessioned2014-03-03T23:24:30Z
dc.date.available2014-03-03T23:24:30Z
dc.date.issued2005-08
dc.identifier.othershrira_ilan_200508_phd
dc.identifier.urihttp://purl.galileo.usg.edu/uga_etd/shrira_ilan_200508_phd
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10724/22796
dc.description.abstractThese studies investigated how individual differences in self-concept clarity affected the accuracy with which people processed information. Since relying on schemas can sometimes lead to mindlessness and the use of inappropriate heuristics, I hypothesized that individuals low in self-concept clarity (who do not use their self-schemas to process information) would perform more accurately on two kinds of objective tasks. In Study 1, people low (vs. high) in self-concept clarity were more accurate on a contingency judgment task (i.e., the Iowa Gambling Task). The accuracy difference seemed to be due to structural differences in the self-concept (Campbell, 1990), rather than a differential tendency to refer to the self-concept when making judgments. Study 2, however, did not replicate Study 1’s effects nor did it find any significant effects for self-concept clarity. In Study 3, participants listened to a “going out to dinner story” that was either about themselves (self-applicable) or other people (non-self-applicable), and then took a recognition memory test for details about the story. Individuals low (vs. high) in self-concept clarity had a higher false alarm rate across both conditions, indicating that they were more likely to use scripts when processing the stories. As a whole, high self-concept clarity impaired performance on a novel, data-driven task (Study 1), but facilitated performance on a routine, memory-based task (Study 3). High self-concept clarity individuals may generate hypotheses that interfere in novel tasks, but may avoid reliance on general knowledge structures during more routine tasks.
dc.languageeng
dc.publisheruga
dc.rightsOn Campus Only
dc.subjectSelf-concept clarity
dc.subjectSchemas
dc.subjectContingency judgments
dc.subjectScripts
dc.titleSelf-concept clarity and efficient processing
dc.typeDissertation
dc.description.degreePhD
dc.description.departmentPsychology
dc.description.majorPsychology
dc.description.advisorLeonard L. Martin
dc.description.committeeLeonard L. Martin
dc.description.committeeW. Keith Campbell
dc.description.committeeMichael H. Kernis
dc.description.committeeDavid R. Shaffer


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