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dc.contributor.authorGulla, Darrin Vincent
dc.date.accessioned2014-03-03T23:21:47Z
dc.date.available2014-03-03T23:21:47Z
dc.date.issued2005-08
dc.identifier.othergulla_darrin_v_200508_phd
dc.identifier.urihttp://purl.galileo.usg.edu/uga_etd/gulla_darrin_v_200508_phd
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10724/22661
dc.description.abstractCorporate boards of directors serve an important function in monitoring management and reducing agency costs. However, some directors have backgrounds that seem to offer little to this end. Former politicians, in particular, fall into this category. The logical explanation for the appearance of such directors is to assist rent-seeking activities rather than to participate in managerial oversight. Though this approach is intuitive, it fails to capture the full range of public choice theories. It is possible that these politically experienced directors obtain their positions through a rent extraction process. The determinants of board political composition are estimated using a probit regression. The impact on firm value from the appointment of a politically experienced director is analyzed using event study procedures. The effectiveness of politically experienced directors in monitoring management is also examined.
dc.languageeng
dc.publisheruga
dc.rightspublic
dc.subjectCorporate Boards
dc.subjectPoliticians
dc.subjectRent-Seeking
dc.subjectRent-Extraction
dc.titlePoliticians and corporate boards
dc.typeDissertation
dc.description.degreePhD
dc.description.departmentEconomics
dc.description.majorEconomics
dc.description.advisorWilliam D. Lastrapes
dc.description.committeeWilliam D. Lastrapes
dc.description.committeeJames S. Linck
dc.description.committeeJohn L. Turner
dc.description.committeeArthur Snow


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